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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson* 
The 1987 session of the General Assembly enacted legislation 
dealing with wills, trusts and estates that amended fourteen sec-
tions and added three new sections to the Code of Virginia (the 
"Code"). In addition to this legislation, there were five cases from 
the Virginia Supreme Court during the past year that involved is-
sues of interest to both the general practitioner and the specialist 
in wills, trusts, and estates. This article reviews all of these legisla-
tive and judicial developments. In order to facilitate the discussion 
of numerous Code sections, they will be ref erred to in the text by 
their section numbers only which, unless otherwise stated, will be 
understood as always referring to the latest printing of the old sec-
tions and to the 1987 supplement for the new sections. 
I. LEGISLATION 
A. Adopted Persons Taking Under Wills or Trusts1 
Prior to 1978, Virginia followed the "stranger to the adoption 
rule" in dealing with the rights of adopted persons to take under a 
will when they were not specifically named and the will failed to 
provide a constructional clause dealing with the matter. Under this 
rule a testator who used generic descriptive terminology such as 
heirs, issue, descendants, sisters, uncles, etc. to describe benefi-
ciaries (other than the testator's own children) was presumed not 
to intend to include within such terms those persons who were 
members of the described class as a result of adoption. The ration-
ale for this rule was that the testator, being a stranger to the adop-
tion, presumably did not wish to be bound thereby.2 In 1978, the 
General Assembly concluded that this rule was no longer represen-
tative of what the majority of Virginians would wish and accord-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond: Member of the 
Virginia Bar; B.A., 1965, William and Mary; J.D., 1967, William and Mary; LL.M., 1970, 
New York University. 
I. VA. CooE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 
2. This rule, and the background of § 64.1-71.1, is discussed in Johnson, Inheritance 
Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275, 291-92 (1978). 
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ingly enacted section 64.1-71.1 to provide that "[i]n the interpreta-
tion of wills and trusts, adopted persons . . . are included in class 
gift terminology and terms of relationship in accordance with rules 
for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succession 
unless a contrary intent shall appear on the face of the will or 
trust."3 The reference to "rules for determining relationships for 
purposes of intestate succession" was a reference to section 
64.1-5.1 which was enacted as a part of the same legislative mea-
sure that enacted section 64.1-71.1 in 1978.4 Section 64.1-5.1 pro-
vides that anytime a relationship of parent and child must be es-
tablished 5 for purposes of title 64.1, "[a]n adopted person is the 
child of an adopting parent"6 and thus gives the adopted person 
the same status in the adoptive family that would be enjoyed if the 
nexus had been a biological one. Thus, sections 64.1-5.1 and 
64.1-71.1 were designed to operate together in order to give 
adopted persons the same intestate and testate succession rights 
throughout their adoptive families that they would have if they 
were biological members thereof. 
However, in the recent case of Hyman v. Glover,7 the Virginia 
Supreme Court held in a 4-3 decision "that Code § 64.1-71.1 does 
not operate to include adopted children within the meaning of the 
word 'issue.' If the General Assembly intends for adopted children 
to be includec;l in the word 'issue,' it must say so."8 
The 1987 session of the General Assembly responded to the 
Glover decision by making a clarifying amendment to section 
64.1-71.1 in order to expressly provide that "[i]n determining the 
intent of a testator or settlor, adopted persons are presumptively 
included in such terms as 'children,' 'issue,' 'kindred,' 'heirs,' 'rela-
tives,' 'descendants' or similar words of classification .... "9 Al-
though believing that this constructional rule would carry out the 
intent of the majority of Virginians, the General Assembly recog-
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (Rep!. Vol. 1980). 
4. 1978 Va. Acts, ch. 647. 
5. It should be noted that all family relationships, other than husband and wife, are a 
function of establishing one or more parent-child relationships. For example, brothers are 
such only because they each have a parent-child relationship with the same mother and 
father. 
6. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(1) (Rep!. Vol. 1987). 
7. 232 Va. 140, 348 S.E.2d 269 (1986). Although not originally associated with this case, 
the author became co-counsel for appellee in the petition for rehearing. 
8. Id. at 147, 348 S.E.2d at 273; see also infra text accompanying notes 60-69. 
9. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-71.1 (Rep!. Vol. 1987). 
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nized that some testators would wish to restrict succession to 
members of their biological family and, in order to also clarify the 
law in this area, the 1987 amendment to section 64.1-71.1 further 
provides that "[i]n determining the intent of a testator or settlor, 
adopted persons . . . are presumptively excluded by such terms as 
'natural children,' 'issue of the body,' 'blood kindred,' 'heirs of the 
body,' 'blood relatives,' 'decendents of the body' [sic] or similar 
words of classification.mo It will be noted that the root words on 
this exclusive list are identical to the words on the positive list, but 
that each root word on the exclusive list is modified by additional 
language such as 'natural,' 'body' or 'blood,' which would rather 
clearly show an intent to exclude adopted persons. Accordingly, in 
interpreting wills and trusts that use generic descriptive terminol-
ogy not specifically mentioned in the statute, it would appear that 
all such other terms would presumptively include adopted persons 
unless these terms are similarly modified by the use of additional 
language such as "natural," "body" or "blood." 
A final clarifying amendment involved the replacement of the 
word "and" with the word "or" in the provision: "In the interpre-
tation of wills and trusts, adopted persons . . . are included in 
class gift terminology or terms of relationship in accordance with 
rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succes-
sion unless a contrary intent shall appear on the face of the will or 
trust."11 The conjunctive was replaced with the disjunctive in order 
to preclude any argument that the statute applied only to those 
gifts involving both a class gift and generic terminology. 
B. Illegitimate Persons Taking Under Wills or Trusts12 
Section 64.1-71.1, discussed in the preceding section in connec-
tion with the rights of adopted persons, has also provided since 
1978 that "[i]n the interpretation of wills and trusts ... persons 
born out of wedlock are included in class gift terminology and 
terms of relationship in accordance with the rules for determining 
relationships for purposes of intestate succession unless a contrary 
intent shall appear on the face of the will or trust."13 In an appar-
ent response to the apprehension that a claim might be made by 
10. Id. 
11. Id. (emphasis added). 
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 
13. Id. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
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one alleging to be an illegitimate member of a class after a fiduci-
ary has distributed an estate or trust, which might expose the dis-
tributing fiduciary to a personal liability, a "good-faith" amend-
ment has been made to section 64.1-71.1 to protect such a fiduciary 
from any liability. This amendment provides that 
"[i]n the event that a fiduciary makes payment to members of a 
class to the exclusion of persons born out of wedlock of whose claim 
of paternity or maternity the fiduciary has no knowledge, the fiduci-
ary shall not be held liable to such persons for payments made prior 
to knowledge of such claim."14 
The problem addressed by this amendment is not believed to be 
a significant one because of the reference in section 64.1-71.1 to 
"the rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate 
succession." This is a reference to section 64.1-5.1 which provides, 
with one exception,15 that a person who has been adopted is no 
longer a child of its biological parents for purposes of title 64.1. 
Accordingly, as the typical illegitimate child will normally be 
adopted in early infancy, its relational link with its illegitimate 
parents will be severed and it will have no basis for a claim in their 
testate or intestate estates or in the estates of their family 
members. 
C. Adopted or Illegitimate Persons Taking Under Deeds16 
The General Assembly has also recognized that the interpretive 
problems regarding (i) adopted persons, as discussed in part A of 
this article, and (ii) illegitimate persons, as discussed in part B of 
this article, might arise in the case of grantors who were using 
deeds as will substitutes. Therefore, new section 55-49.1 was added 
by the 1987 session to provide the same rules for the interpretation 
of such deeds as section 64.1-71.1 provides for wills and trusts. 
14. Id. § 64.1-71.1 (Rep!. Vol. 1987). 
15. Id. § 64.1-5.1.(1) (Rep!. Vol. 1987) provides that "[a]n adopted person is the child of 
an adopting parent and not of the biological parents, except that adoption of a child by the 
spouse of a biological parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and either 
biological parent .... " 
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-49.1 (Supp. 1987). 
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D. The Family Allowance17 
Section 64.1-151.1, the family allowance provision, was added to 
the Code in 1981 as a part of a comprehensive act designed to re-
spond to the immediate economic needs of the surviving spouse 
and minor children of a deceased Virginia domiciliary. The pur-
pose of the family allowance is to provide for the maintenance of 
the surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent was 
obligated to support by awarding them a "reasonable allowance in 
money" from the decedent's estate during the probate period.18 A 
problem arose in this area of the law in 1986 when a circuit court 
ruled that a surviving spouse was not entitled to a family allow-
ance unless the decedent was also survived by a minor child.19 This 
problem has been eliminated by the 1987 amendment to section 
64.1-151.1 which provides that "[i]f there are no minor children, 
the allowance is payable to the surviving spouse."20 
E. Payment of Small Accounts m Savings and Loan 
Associations21 
Section 6.1-194.58 is a probate avoidance statute that allows a 
savings and loan association to pay out the balance of a decedent's 
account to certain persons if (i) the account does not ex:ceed 
$5,000, (ii) sixty days have passed since the account owner's death, 
and (iii) there has been no qualification on the decedent's estate. 
Prior to July 1, 1986, the permissible payees under this statute 
were the decedent's spouse or, if none, the decedent's next of kin.22 
Other statutes provide remedies for accounts in banks or trust 
companies,23 and credit unions.24 
The 1986 session of the General Assembly intended to modify all 
of these statutes by striking the secondary provision, "to his or her 
17. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-151.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 
18. The family allowance is limited to one year if the decedent's estate is insolvent; other-
wise it continues until the probate process is completed. The background of the family al-
lowance will be found in Johnson, Support of the Surviving Spouse and Minor Children in 
Virginia: Proposed Legislation v. Present Law, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 639 (1980). A further 
discussion of the family allowance section can be found in Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Es-
tates, 68 VA. L. REV. 521, 522-23 (1982). 
19. In re Estate of Hess, 8 Va. Cir. 256 (Roanoke 1986). 
20. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-151.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-194.58 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. § 6.1-71 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
24. Id. § 6.1-208.4 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
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next of kin,'' and replacing it with "to the distributees of the dece-
dent or other persons entitled thereto under the laws of this Com-
monwealth."211 However, the 1986 legislation also inadvertantly de-
leted the primary provision in favor of the decedent's "spouse" 
from the savings and loan section. The 1987 session corrects this 
error by restoring the spouse as the primary beneficiary in section 
6.1-194.58. 
F. Payment of Small Trust or Estate Sums to Persons Entitled26 
Section 64.1-123.3 was enacted by the 1985 session of the Gen-
eral Assembly to facilitate probate avoidance where an amount not 
exceeding $5,000 is due a decedent from a trust fund. In such a 
case, if there has been no qualification on the decedent's estate 
within sixty days after death, this section provides that the trustee 
"may pay such sum to the distributees of the decedent or other 
person entitled thereto under the laws of this Commonwealth. "27 
The 1987 amendment broadens the scope of this section by ex-
tending the same remedy, under the same conditions, to those 
cases where the sum is due to a decedent from the personal repre-
sentative of another decedent's estate. 
G. Disbursements and Accountings in Small Estates28 
Section 8.01-606, dealing with the payment of small amounts to 
certain persons through a court without the intervention of a fidu-
ciary, and the parallel authority of commissioners of accounts, has 
been amended (i) to increase the ceiling applicable to circuit courts 
from $4,000 to $5,000 in all cases, (ii) to increase the ceiling appli-
cable to commissioners of accounts from $4,000 to $5,000 when 
dealing with wills that authorize distributions to incompetents or 
infants without the intervention of a guardian or committee, and 
(iii) to authorize circuit courts to exempt fiduciaries from filing 
further accounts when the funds being administered do not exceed 
$5,000. 
25. See id. 
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123.3 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 
27. Id. 
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-606 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
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H. Waiver of Probate Fees and Requirements for Small 
Estates29 
Section 26-12.3 formerly provided that when an estate does not 
exceed $500, and an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose claim ex-
ceeds the value of the estate seeks to qualify as personal represen-
tative, the clerk shall waive (i) payment of tax30 or court costs 
upon such qualification, (ii) inventory under section 26-12, 31 and 
(iii) settlement under section 26-17.32 The 1987 amendment raises 
the ceiling in this section from $500 to $5,000. 
I. Commissioner's Authority-Fiduciary Bonds33 
Section 26-2, which requires commissioners of accounts to ex-
amine and report on bonds and whether fiduciaries should be re-
moved, has been amended to further provide that: 
When any fiduciary of an estate has given a bond to the court and 
then absconds with or improperly disburses any or all of the assets 
of the estate, the commissioner may petition the court in which the 
order was made conferring his authority on the. fiduciary, and ask 
the court to order that such bond be forfeited. 34 
J. Postmarital Contracts35 
The 1985 session of the General Assembly enacted a Premarital 
Agreement Act (the "Act")36 which, after its required reenactment 
by the 1986 session, (i) applies to all premarital agreements exe-
cuted on or after July 1, 1986, and (ii) validates premarital agree-
ments made prior to that time if they are otherwise valid as con-
tracts. 37 The Act provides, inter alia, that spouses may contract 
with respect to (i) the disposition of property upon death, and 
29. VA. CoDE ANN. § 26-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
30. It is unclear how this provision for the clerk's waiver of "tax" is affected by VA. CODE 
ANN. § 58.1-1712 (Cum. Supp. 1987), which imposes a tax "on the probate of every will or 
grant of administration not exempt by law,'' and also provides that "the tax imposed by this 
section shall not apply to decedents' estates of $500 or less in value." Id. 
31. Id. § 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 1985). 
32. Id. § 26-17 (Rep!. Vol. 1985). 
33. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-2 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
34. Id. 
35. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-155 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
36. Id. §§ 20-147 to -154 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
37. A discussion of the Premarital Agreement Act is found in Swisher & Bucur, Domestic 
Relations: Annual Suruey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 731 (1985). 
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(ii) the making of a will, trust or other arrangement to carry out 
the provisions of the agreement. 38 
The increasing publicity concerning the topic of premarital 
agreements has caused many persons who are already married to 
inquire about the possibility of will contracts, and other forms of 
postmarital agreements to settle their property rights upon death. 
Although the existence of the basic right to enter into postmarital 
agreements for such purposes has been clear,39 the permissible 
scope of these agreements and the remedies in connection with 
their breach has not. 
The 1987 session remedied this problem in a very straightfor-
ward manner by enacting section 20-155 to provide that married 
persons can contract with each other concerning their property 
rights (i) to the same extent, (ii) with the same effect, and (iii) 
subject to the same conditions as can persons who are engaged to 
be married. This approach of fncorporating by reference the provi-
sions of the Premarital Agreement Act, in addition to the obvious 
equitable argument, has the additional merits of statutory econ-
omy and ease of understanding on the part of the attorney and the 
consumer. 
K. Acts Barring Property Rights40 
The 1981 session of the General Assembly enacted an expanded 
"anti-slayer's act" in order to more completely prevent a person 
who has wrongfully killed another from succeeding to the property 
of the victim or in any way benefiting from the wrongful killing.41 
Unfortunately, this 1981 legislation perpetuated one of the 
problems of the predecessor statute because it narrowly defined 
the term "slayer" as a "person who is convicted of the murder of 
the decedent. "42 Because of this narrow definition, there continued 
to be no statutory remedy43 in those cases where the killer was 
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-150 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
39. Harlan v. Weatherly, 183 Va. 49, 31 S.E.2d 263 (1944). 
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 1987). 
41. A discussion of this expanded "anti slayer's act" is found in Johnson, Wills, Trusts, 
and Estates, 68 VA. L. REv. 521, 525-28 (1982). 
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401 (Rep!. Vol. 1986). 
43. Notwithstanding the absence of a statutory remedy, the common-law remedy of con-
structive trust may still be available. Although decided under a prior statute, the case of 
Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 269 S.E.2d 787 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Cross v. Sundin, 
452 U.S. 911 (1981), will be helpful in determining whether the Virginia Supreme Court will 
regard the statutory remedy in the new act as exclusive or merely cumulative with existing 
common law. 
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only charged with manslaughter or, though charged with murder, 
(i) died prior to being convicted, (ii) was convicted of a lesser in-
cluded offense, (iii) was acquitted because, even though clearly 
guilty by a preponderance of the evidence, guilt could not be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, (iv) plea-bargained a guilty 
plea in return for a reduced charge, or (v) was acquitted on the 
grounds of temporary insanity. 
The 1987 amendment to section 55-401 responds to some of 
these considerations by expanding the definition of "slayer" to also 
include any person "in the absence of such conviction and where 
such person has not been acquitted and is not available for prose-
cution by reason of his death by suicide or otherwise, who is deter-
mined by a court of appropriate jurisdiction by a preponderance of 
the evidence to have murdered the decedent. "44 The amendment 
further provides that one seeking to establish that a decedent was 
murdered by such a person will have the burden of proof on the 
issue. 
L. Springing Powers of Attorney45 
As the statistical lifespan of the average American continues to 
increase, so also the incidence of mental incompetence can be ex-
pected to increase in the future. It is also being recognized that 
mental incompetence is not confined to the elderly as is often as-
sumed. Like death, incompetence can come (i) at any age, (ii) due 
to illness or accidental injury, and (iii) without any prior warning. 
This increasing awareness on the part of both lawyer and con-
sumer has led to an increased demand for powers of attorney to be 
used on a client's behalf if it becomes necessary. However, many 
lawyers have regularly drafted powers of attorney for their clients 
that were designed to become effective immediately upon delivery 
to the client's agent, instead of becoming effective "if and when" 
the client becomes incompetent. These lawyers have been reluctant 
to draw powers of attorney that were designed to come into legal 
existence at some time in the future when, by definition, the prin-
cipal would be lacking in capacity to appoint an agent. 
This legal uncertainty has been laid to rest by new section 11-9.4 
which authorizes springing powers of attorney if the document in 
44. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-401 (Supp. 1987). 
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.4 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
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question expressly provides that it will be effective only upon "(i) a 
specified future date, (ii) the occurrence of a specified future event 
or (iii) the existence of a specified condition which may occur in 
the future."46 A further problem that has been presented by 
springing powers is convincing a third party that the condition at-
tached to the power has actually occurred. Section 11-9.4 responds 
to this concern by further providing that "[i]n the absence of ac-
tual knowledge to the contrary, any person to whom such writing is 
presented shall be entitled to rely on an affidavit, executed by the 
attorney in fact or agent, setting forth that such event has oc-
curred or condition exists. "47 
Although this is good legislation, it still does not eliminate the 
concern of clients who do not wish a particular person to have a 
presently exercisable power. It would seem that such a client may 
really be saying that the person in question does not have the cli-
ent's complete trust and confidence. If that is the case, it is sub-
mitted that the correct solution to the problem is not the use of a 
springing power but the selection of another person to serve as the 
client's agent. 
M. Provision for Burial of Ward or Ward's Spouse48 
Section 37.1-142, dealing with the preservation, management, 
and gifts of a ward's estate by a court-appointed fiduciary, has 
been amended to provide that the fiduciary: 
may transfer assets of a ward or a ward's estate into an irrevocable 
trust where such transfer has been designated solely for burial of the 
ward or spouse of the ward in accordance with conditions set forth 
in§ 32.1-325(2)49 and may also contractually bind a ward or a ward's 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. VA. CoDE ANN. § 37.1-142 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
49. The Code requires the State Board of Medical Assistance Services to include in its 
state plan for medical assistance services pursuant to title XIX of the United States Social 
Security Act the following: 
A provision for determining eligibility for benefits which disregards any transfer of 
assets into an irrevocable trust where such transfer has been designated solely for 
burial of the transferor or his spouse. The amount transferred into the irrevocable 
trust together with the face value of life insurance and any other irrevocable funeral 
arrangements shall not exceed $2,000 prior to July 1, 1988, and shall not .exceed 
$2,500 after July 1, 1988. 
VA. CoDE ANN. § 32.1-325(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
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estate by executing a contract described in § 11-2450 for the benefit 
of the ward. 
N. lvfarital Deduction-Constructional Rules51 
Prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA),52 the 
maximum marital deduction allowed under federal estate tax law 
was limited to the larger of $250,000 or one-half of the decedent's 
adjusted gross estate. As Congress knew that many pre-ERTA doc-
uments were drafted in formula language referring to the "maxi-
mum marital deduction," ERTA contained a transitional rule 
preventing its unlimited marital deduction provisions from apply-
ing to such documents unless they were amended after September 
12, 1981 "to refer specifically to an unlimited marital deduction." 
Absent such an amendment, the transitional rule provided that 
these pre-ERTA documents would be deemed to refer to the pre-
ERTA marital deduction unless governing state law was amended 
to provide a contrary result. The 1982 session of the General As-
sembly enacted section 64.1-62.1 as a parallel constructional rule, 
mutatis mutandis, to govern the rights of beneficiaries claiming 
under these same pre-ERTA documents. 
In recognition of the fact that some drafters use formula lan-
guage other than "maximum marital deduction," the 1987 amend-
ment to section 64.1-62.1 provides an additional constructional 
rule for non-specifically-amended, pre-ERTA documents that con-
tain a formula providing for "the maximum amount of property 
qualifying for the marital deduction allowable under federal law,· 
but no more than will reduce such federal estate tax to zero or any 
other pecuniary or fractional share of property determined with 
reference to the marital deduction."53 In such a case the amend-
ment provides that the beneficiaries' rights will be determined as if 
the decedent had died and the computation in question had been 
calculated on December 31, 1981. 
Lastly, section 64.1-62.1 was amended to provide that (i) its sev-
eral constructional rules will not apply if the decedent had a con-
50. This Code section, entitled "Delivery of goods or merchandise; execution of contracts; 
money or other consideration to be held in trust; acknowledgment and recordation," deals 
with a variety of considerations relating to burial contracts. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-24 (Cum. 
Supp. 1987). 
51. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-62.1 (Rep!. Vol. 1987). 
52. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). 
53. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-62.l(B) (Rep!. Vol. 1987). 
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trary intent, (ii) that any proceeding to determine the existence of 
a contrary intent must be filed within twelve months following the 
decedent's death, and (iii) any such proceeding may be filed by the 
personal representative or any affected beneficiary under the will 
or other instrument. 
0. Virginia Estate Tax Lien54 
Section 58.1-908 of the Virginia Estate Tax Act previously pro-
vided for a lien to arise automatically upon the Virginia property 
of a nonresident decedent having a taxable estate, while a lien on 
the Virginia property of a resident decedent having a taxable es-
tate would arise only upon the filing of a memorandum in the ap-
propriate clerk's office by the Department of Taxation. The 1987 
amendment to section 58.1-908 ends the discriminatory treatment 
of nonresident decedents and provides that no lien will arise 
against any decedent's estate until the Department of Taxation 
has filed the required memorandum in the appropriate clerk's 
office.55 
P. Declarations of Estimated Tax for Trusts and Estates56 
Several amendments have been made to Code section 58.1-490. 
First, the fiduciary of every estate (except for taxable years ending 
less than two years after the decedent's death) and every trust 
must file a declaration of its estimated tax for every taxable year, if 
its Virginia taxable income can reasonably be expected to exceed 
$400. Second, any overpayment of estimated taxes must be re-
funded to the fiduciary and cannot be taken as a credit by a bene-
ficiary on the beneficiary's individual return. Third, any reference 
to an "individual" in the estimated tax provisions of the Code is 
deemed to include a fiduciary required to file a declaration for an 
estate or trust.57 Section 58.1-493 has also been amended to pro-
vide that the required declaration of estimated tax is to be filed 
with the commissioner of revenue for the jurisdiction where the 
54. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58.1-908 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
55. The "appropriate office" for a lien on the personal estate of the decedent is the clerk's 
office of the county or city wherein the decedent resided, and for real estate it is the clerk's 
office of the county or city wherein such real estate is located. Id. § 58.1-908(A)(2). 
56. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-490, -493 (Cum. Supp. 1987). The reader will note that 
§ 58.1-490 is set out twice, and reference in this article is made to the second version, effec-
tive for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 1988. 
57. Id. § 58.1-490. 
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fiduciary qualified or, if there is no Virginia qualification, in the 
city or county where the fiduciary resides, does business or has an 
office, or where any of the beneficiaries reside. All of these amend-
ments are effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 
1, 1988.118 
Q. Generation Skipping Tax119 
Section 58.1-936 imposes a pick-up tax on certain generation-
skipping tr an sf ers that is keyed into the fetleral credit allowable 
for state taxes on generation-skipping transfers. The 1987 amend-
ments to section 58.1-936 are for conformance purposes following 
the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, to change the reference 
to the federal statute from Internal Revenue Code section 2602 to 
Internal Revenue Code section 2604, and to state the section's ap-
plicability to transfers occurring after October 22, 1986. 
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Adopted Persons Taking Under Wills 
In Hyman v. Glover,60 the relevant portion of the testatrix' will 
gave a share of her estate to each of her children "and one share to 
the issue of each deceased child of mine, such issue to take, collec-
tively, per stirpes, the share of their deceased ancestor."61 The trial 
court held that, under section 64.1-71.1,62 "[t]he word 'issue,' 
standing alone, now includes persons who qualify by or through 
adoption."63 Accordingly, the trial court granted an adopted grand-
daughter's motion for summary judgment that she was entitled to 
the one-fifth share of her deceased father in the testatrix' estate. 
The Virginia Supreme Court's 4-3 decision reversing the trial court 
concluded "that Code § 64.1-71.1 does not operate to include 
adopted children within the meaning of the word 'issue.' If the 
General Assembly intends for adopted children to be included in 
the word 'issue,' it must say so."64 In response to this decision, the 
58. Id. § 58.1-493. 
59. VA. CODE ANN.§ 58.1-936 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
60. 232 Va. 140, 348 S.E.2d 269 (1986). Although not originally associated with this case, 
the author became co-counsel for appellee in the petition for rehearing. 
61. Id. at 141, 348 S.E.2d at 270. 
62. The relevant language of this section, as it existed at testatrix' death, is reproduced in 
the text following note 2, supra. 
63. Glover, 232 Va. at 142, 348 S.E.2d at 270. 
64. Id. at 147, 348 S.E.2d at 273. 
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1987 session of the General Assembly enacted a clarifying amend-
ment to section 64.1-71.1 which reads as follows: 
In determining the intent of a testator or settlor, adopted persons 
are presumptively included in such terms as "children," "issue," 
"kindred," "heirs," "relatives," "descendants" or similar words of 
classification and are presumptively excluded by such terms as "nat-
ural children," "issue of the body," "blood kindred," "heirs of the 
body," "blood relatives," "decendents of the body" [sic] or similar 
words of classification.65 
Although this 1987 legislation addresses the primary issue raised 
by the Glover decision, eliminating the need for extended discus-
sion of the case, there is one point that needs to be noted because 
of its possible impact on the construction of statutes dealing with 
adopted persons in the future. In one part of its opinion, the ma-
jority states that "[g]iven the common law meaning of the word 
'issue,' any statute enacted to change that meaning would necessa-
rily be in derogation of the common law ... [and] 'statutes "in der-
ogation of the common law are to be strictly construed . . . . ' "66 
This language should be contrasted with the Court's language in 
Fletcher v. Flanary,67 stating: 
The right to adopt children was unknown to the common law and 
is probably inherited from the civil law of Rome. Since it is not in 
derogation of the common law, the strict construction of statutes 
which hinge upon that system are not to be applied. With us the 
entire field of adoption is covered by statute. 
Since these statutes confer a beneficial interest they are to be lib-
erally construed, particularly in a contest between the adopted son 
and the estate of his intestate foster parents, to a less extent when 
the contest is between the adopted son and the estate of some re-
mote ancestor by adoption.68 
Although the Fletcher case was cited in the Glover majority opin-
ion, 69 it was cited on another issue, and the majority opinion ap-
65. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987). A complete discussion of this clarifying 
amendment is found supra part A at notes 1-11. 
66. Glover, 232 Va. at 143, 348 S.E.2d at 271 (citations omitted). 
67. 185 Va. 409, 38 S.E.2d 433 (1946). 
68. Id. at 411-12, 38 S.E.2d at 434. 
69. 232 Va. at 143, 348 S.E.2d at 271 (citing Fletcher, 185 Va. at 415, 38 S.E.2d at 435). 
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pears to be unaware of this aspect of the prior decision in the 
Fletcher case. 
B. Construction of "Nearest Living Paternal Kindred" 
In Elmore v. Virginia National Bank,70 the relevant portion of 
the settlor's trust agreement identified her ultimate takers as "the 
nearest living paternal kindred of the Grantor."71 The grantor was 
survived by two paternal first cousins. Three other paternal first 
cousins predeceased the grantor but were survived by issue who 
claimed that they were entitled to their deceased parent's share. 
Although the issue would have been so entitled under intestate 
succession principles, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded 
that " 'kindred' is not a highly technical term whose primary 
meaning is determined by reference to the statute of descent and 
distribution. It is similar to the phrase 'next of kin,' which we have 
held is a nontechnical term whose commonly accepted meaning is 
'nearest in blood.' "72 
The court's construction in the instant case was further rein-
forced by the fact that the trust instrument contained a reference 
to the statute of descent and distribution in another provision that 
preceded the provision in question by only two sentences. The 
court concluded that this reference "demonstrates that the drafter 
of the instrument understood the import of the chosen language 
and intended to accomplish a different result."73 Accordingly, the 
court affirmed the trial court's holding that the term "nearest liv-
ing paternal kindred" was clear and unambiguous, and that the 
two surviving first cousins were the sole takers thereunder. 
C. Surviving Spouse as "Heir at Law" 
In Carter v. King,74 the relevant language of a testamentary 
trust, created in 1920, provided for a life estate in one person "with 
remainder to her heirs at law, to be determined as of the date of 
her death.''711 Upon the life tenant's death in 1982, she was sur-
70. 232 Va. 310, 350 S.E.2d 603 (1986). The author served as co-counsel for appellants in 
this case. 
71. Id. at 312, 350 S.E.2d at 605. 
72. Id. at 314, 350 S.E.2d at 606. 
73. Id. at 315, 350 S.E.2d at 607. 
74. 233 Va. 60, 353 S.E.2d 738 (1987). 
75. Id. at 61, 353 S.E.2d at 739. 
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vived by her second husband and by two children of her first mar-
riage. The issue before the court was the correctness of the trial 
court's holding that decedent's surviving husband was not an "heir 
at law" of decedent within the meaning of section 64.1-1.76 On July 
1, 1982, twenty-five days before decedent's death, newly-amended 
section 64.1-1 became effective and identified the first category of 
heirs as follows: 
First. To the surviving spouse of the intestate, unless the intestate is 
survived by children or their descendants, one or more of whom are 
not children or their descendants of the surviving spouse, in which 
case such estate shall pass to the intestate's children and their de-
scendants subject to the provisions of § 64.1-19.77 
This statutory language clearly identifies a decedent's surviving 
spouse as the sole heir (i) if the decedent leaves no surviving de-
scendants, or (ii) if all of the decedent's surviving descendants are 
also descendants of the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the 
court held that "a surviving spouse is not an heir of the decedent 
when, as here, 'the intestate is survived by children or their de-
scendants, one or more of whom are not children or their descend-
ants of the surviving spouse.' "78 In such a case the intestate's heirs 
are the intestate's children or their descendants, to whom the dece-
dent's realty descends subject to the surviving spouse's dower or 
curtesy rights under section 64.1-19. Although dower and curtesy 
rights were increased from a life estate in one-third to a fee simple 
estate in one-third in 1977, the court saw the increase as relating 
only to that interest's dimensions, as opposed to its character, and 
thus "reject[ed] the suggestion that the General Assembly in-
tended the amendment to convert dower or curtesy, a marital 
right, into a right of inheritance.''79 
76. "The parties agree that ... the question whether a surviving spouse is an heir at law 
in this Commonwealth is governed by the provisions of Code§ 64.1-1 and related statutes in 
effect on the date of the decedent's death." Carter, 233 Va. at 61, 353 S.E.2d at 739. 
77. This section of the Code provides that: 
A surviving spouse shall be entitled to a dower or curtesy interest in fee simple of one 
third of all tlie real estate whereof the deceased spouse or any other to his use was at 
any time seized during coverture of an estate of inheritance, unless such right shall 
have been lawfully barred or relinquished. 
VA. CooE ANN. § 64.1-19 (Rep!. Vol. 1987). 
78. Carter, 233 Va. at 63, 353 S.E.2d at 740. 
79. Id. 
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D. Contract Execution Prevents Later Disclaimer 
In Niklason v. Ramsey,80 the decedent's will was challenged on 
the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity. The parties to the 
suit, including the decedent's son, entered into an agreement to 
invalidate the will and divide the estate. The decedent's son then 
purported to disclaim his interest in his mother's estate. 
Two of the son's judgment creditors challenged the disclaimer as 
invalid under Code section 64.1-194 which. provides that "[a]ny 
. . . assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge or transfer of 
property or interest therein or contract therefor . . . bars the right 
to disclaim as to the property or interest."81 In affirming the trial 
court's decision finding the disclaimer ineffective, the Virginia Su-
preme Court said that "by contracting away whatever interest [the 
son] may have had in his mother's estate, [he] exercised dominion 
over her estate contrary to the language of Code § 64.1-194."82 
E. Joint Account Funds Used to Purchase Treasury Bills 
In Bennet v. First & Merchants National Bank,83 the Virginia 
Supreme Court considered whether the ownership of a United 
States Treasury Bill purchased with joint account funds is deter-
mined by section 6.1-125.5.84 
In Bennet, a father (Butler) and daughter (Mindy) opened a sur-
vivorship joint bank account, funded by Butler's money. At But-
ler's request, Mindy took the passbook to the bank and purchased 
a six-month $100,000 Treasury Bill. The "Security Buy Memo" 
listed Butler as "customer," and Mindy as "co-owner." The inter-
nal bank records listed the purchase as "for the account of Taylor 
Scott Butler." Butler died before the Treasury Bill matured. After 
Butler's death, the bank corrected its records to show the purchase 
"as agent" for "Taylor Scott Butler or Mindy Thompson." The 
80. 233 Va. 161, 353 S.E.2d 783 (1987). 
81. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-194 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 
82. Niklason, 233 Va. at 164, 353 S.E.2d at 784. 
83. 233 Va. 355, 355 S.E.2d 888 (1987). 
84. The Code provides, insofar as relevant to this, that "[s]ums remaining on deposit at 
the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as against the 
estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention 
at the time the account is created." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.5(A) (Repl. Vol. 1983). The 
background to this legislation will be found in Johnson, Joint Totten Trust, and P.O.D. 
Bank Accounts: Virginia Law Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 
41 (1973). 
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bank's practice was to debit its customer's account upon the 
purchase of Treasury Bills. 85 
The Virginia Supreme Court first noted that Code section 
6.1-125.5(A), dealing with survivorship in joint accounts, was not 
applicable to the case because the relationship between the deposi-
tor (Butler) and the United States government was not an "ac-
count" as that term is defined in the Code.86 The Code's definition 
of "account" required a debtor-creditor relationship between a de-
positor and the financial institution. The court concluded that the 
only debtor-creditor relationship with respect to the Treasury Bill 
was between the bank and the government. 87 
Furthermore, the court noted that section 55-2088 abolishes the 
common-law right of survivorship between joint tenants except 
" 'when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument 
that it was intended the part of the one dying should then belong 
to the others.' "89 There was no evidence in the case applicable to 
this exception. 
The court also considered Butler's ownership of the bank ac-
count prior to and at the time the funds were withdrawn. It was 
clear to the court that pursuant to section 6.1-125.S(A),90 the funds 
belonged solely to Butler. The court said that it was established 
Virginia law that "[a]ny asset purchased with his funds at his di-
rection is presumed to be his sole property in the absence of evi-
dence that it was intended to be the subject of a gift, or unless he 
made a different disposition by contract."91 The presumption was 
not rebutted. Thus, the court reversed the trial court's decision 
that the Treasury Bill was excluded from Butler's estate by virtue 
of survivorship. 92 
85. Bennet, 233 Va. 355, 355 S.E.2d 888. 
86. 233 Va. at 360, 355 S.E.2d at 890-91. For purposes of multiple party accounts, 
§ 6.1-125.1(1) defines an "account" as "a contract of deposit of funds between a depositor 
and a financial institution, and includes a checking account, savings account, certificate of 
deposit, share account, and other like arrangement." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.1(1) (Repl. 
Vol. 1983); see also id. §§ 6.1-125.1 to 125.16. 
87. Bennet, 233 Va. at 360, 355 S.E.2d at 891. 
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (Repl. Vol. 1986). 
89. Bennet, 233 Va. at 360, 355 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 
1986)). 
90. The Code provides, insofar as relevant to these facts, that "[a] joint account belongs, 
during the lifetimes of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by 
each to the sums on deposit .... "VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.1-125.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
91. Bennet, 233 Va. at 361, 355 S.E.2d at 891. 
92. Id. 
